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The Trafficking Victim 
Protection Act: The Best Hope 
for International Human Rights 
Litigation in the U.S. Courts? 
Sara Sun Beale 
Since the 1980s, the Alien Tort Statute1 (ATS) has been the main 
vehicle used to bring human rights claims against corporations and 
individuals in the U.S. courts.  Several recent decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court have radically restricted the scope of the ATS.   
After a brief description of the rise of human rights litigation 
under the ATS and the cases that have restricted its use, this essay 
explores whether the Trafficking Victim Protection Act (TVPA) can 
take the place of the ATS as a vehicle for litigating claims of human 
rights abuses in civil cases or criminal prosecutions in the U.S. federal 
courts.  It concludes that for a narrow but important class of human 
rights violations— those involving forced labor, sex and forced labor 
trafficking, and knowingly benefitting from any of these offenses—the 
TVPA offers a firm footing for both civil and criminal cases.   
These offenses are the subject of considerable interest at the 
present time. The UN’s Ruggie Principles2 require states to “protect 
 
 Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School.  The author would 
like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Logan Page, 
Duke Law ‘19.  Some portions of this analysis are drawn from Sara Sun 
Beale, United States Country Report for “Prosecuting Corporations for 
Violations of International Criminal Law: Jurisdictional Issues,” Section 
4 of the XXTH Association International De Droit/International 
Association of Penal Law Congress, 88 INT’L REV. CRIM. L., issue 2 
(forthcoming 2018),  http://www.penal.org/en/list-national-groups. The 
author participated in the group of advisers that developed the draft 
resolutions discussed in the text accompanying note 5. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). For the original version of the ATS, see 
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73. 
2. In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed UN Special 
Representative John Ruggie’s “Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework.” They read: 
 “These Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of: 
 
 (a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; 
 (b) The role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society 
performing specialized functions, required to comply with all applicable 
laws and to respect human rights; 
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against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction 
by third parties, including business enterprises” by “taking 
appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such 
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication.”3  Both national and international groups are focusing 
on the need to hold corporations responsible.4  At the Association 
Internationale De Droit Pénal’s next International Congress, delegates 
from dozens of countries will consider draft resolutions urging states 
to revise and develop their legal frameworks to enable the 
investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses that occur 
in a company’s core business activity, in its supply or 
distribution chain, and in its other business arrangements that 
involve multiple legal entities.5  Additionally, a broad coalition of 
85 Swiss organizations is seeking to develop a framework to protect 
human rights and the environment abroad by setting common 
benchmarks for all companies based in Switzerland.6 
 
 (c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate 
and effective remedies when breached. 
 These Guiding Principles apply to all States and to all business 
enterprises, both transnational and others, regardless of their size, 
sector, location, ownership and structure.” 
 U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ 
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, (last visited June 3, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/ULP7-DR8D]. 
3. Id. 
4. See DAVID VOGEL, THE REVIVAL OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
in THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY at 11, (2005) (“…national and 
international business organizations active in promoting [Corporate 
Social Responsibility] include the International Business Leaders Forum, 
the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, the Conference Board, 
Business in the Community, and San Francisco–based Business for 
Social Responsibility.”). 
5. See XXth AIDP International Congress of Penal Law, Prosecuting 
Companies for Violations of International Human Rights: Jurisdictional 
Issues, DRAFT RESOLUTIONS, (June 2-4, 2017), last visited Mar. 31, 
2018) http://www.penal.org/sites/default/files/files/XX_AIDP_ 
DRAFT_RESOLUTIONS_circulate.pdf. [https://perma.cc/6E52-
VAT8]. The Association holds national groups in more than 30 
countries.  See also AIDP, List of National Groups, 
http://www.penal.org/en/list-national-groups (last visited Feb. 1, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/SC87-89C9]. 
6. SWISS COALITION FOR CORPORATE JUSTICE, http://konzern-
initiative.ch/?lang=en (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/P3M9-F48S]. 
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Although the TVPA can make a contribution to efforts to hold 
corporations responsible for human rights violations, unfortunately 
many of its key statutory terms are unclear and, in some cases, poorly 
drafted.  The flaws appeared as Congress repeatedly returned to the 
topic of trafficking in connection with reauthorizing funding for 
related programs, adding substantive provisions that seem to have 
received little scrutiny.7 The courts have interpreted few of these 
terms, and it is difficult to say how much they will hamper 
enforcement.   
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the rise in 
ATS litigation and the Supreme Court’s decisions restricting its 
application, which provide an incentive to search for alternatives and 
may also reflect judicial attitudes that could affect the interpretation 
of the TVPA.  Part II discusses the enactment and amendment of the 
TVPA, and provides an overview of the key offenses as well as the 
civil and criminal remedies. Part III explores issues raised by 
Congress’s failure to define key statutory terms, and what appears to 
be a significant drafting error.  It offers tentative conclusions about 
the scope of those terms, and thus the reach of the statute. It is too 
early to say how helpful the TVPA will be in plugging even part of 
the gap left by the judicial restriction of the ATS. 
I. The rise and fall of ATS litigation 
The ATS has been interpreted to provide the federal courts with 
jurisdiction over civil actions based on customary international law, 
but in the past two decades the statute’s reach has been substantially 
narrowed by judicial decisions. The ATS, which was passed as part of 
the first Judiciary Act of 1789, gives the federal courts original 
jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”8 
Beginning with a landmark decision in 1980, lower federal courts 
held that the ATS provided a private cause of action under 
international law.  In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala9 the Second Circuit held 
that held the ATS provided federal jurisdiction in a suit brought by 
Paraguayan nationals against a citizen of Paraguay in United States 
for wrongfully causing the death of their son by the use of torture.10 
The court ended its opinion with language suggesting the federal 
 
7. Mary Catherine Hendrix, Enforcing the U.S. Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act in Emerging Markets: The Challenge of Affecting Change 
in India and China, 43 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 195 (2010). 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). 
9. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
10. Id. at 878, 887. 
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courts could play an important role in what it called “the ageless 
dream” of freedom from gross human rights violations: 
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations 
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize 
that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual 
and collective interest. Among the rights universally proclaimed 
by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be free of 
physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the 
torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him 
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding 
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our 
First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment 
of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.11 
Human rights organizations and individual alien plaintiffs soon 
adopted the strategy of suing corporations (rather than foreign 
governments) under the ATS.12  Plaintiffs saw the ATS as offering 
multiple advantages, including a neutral forum and favorable 
substantive law, as well as “liberal pretrial discovery; . . . jury trials 
in civil litigation; higher damage awards, including punitive damages; 
class action litigation; contingent fee arrangements with counsel; the 
absence of ‘loser pay’ rules for the unsuccessful party; and statutory 
protections for international law violations.”13   
In response to the explosion of ATS litigation, the federal courts 
have cut back substantially on the statute’s effective reach. The 
Supreme Court imposed two significant limitations.  In Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain the Court limited the ATS to a narrow range of 
well-established and specifically defined international law violations.14 
 
11. Id. at 890. 
12. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and 
the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L. J. 709, 718–19 
(2012) (describing the shift in litigation strategy and noting dramatic 
rise in ATS filings following suit against Unocal). 
13. Id. at 723 (quoting Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2008)). 
14. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).  The Court agreed 
that the ATS provides a basis for jurisdiction but it found “no basis to 
suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts 
corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses: violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. 
Noting that “there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the 
discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of 
action of this kind,” it held that “courts should require any claim based 
on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.” Id. at 725. 
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In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum the Court held that the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes bars alien 
tort claims over conduct that does not “touch and concern the 
territory of the United States … with sufficient force.”15 The lower 
courts have generally understood the Kiobel ruling to bar all suits 
based on tortious conduct that occurred solely overseas.16  However, 
one lower court allowed an ATS suit alleging torture by U.S. military 
contractors in Iraq to go forward.17 The lower federal courts have also 
applied a variety of other doctrines to limit ATS suits, including 
prudential or judicially created exhaustion remedies, forum non 
conveniens, and heightened pleading standards.18 The decisions have 
had a dramatic effect: by one count, within the first two years after 
the decision in Kiobel, lower courts dismissed nearly 70 percent of the 
cases brought under the key statute used by plaintiffs seeking relief 
for human rights violations.19 
Additionally, the question remains whether the ATS has any 
application to corporate defendants.  The circuits split on the 
question of whether corporations were subject to suit under the ATS, 
with one influential circuit holding that corporate liability has not 
been established as part of international law.20  The Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.21 
 
15. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013). 
16. See David Nersessian, International Human Rights Litigation: A Guide 
for Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. INT’L. LITIG. GUIDE, 2016, at 1, 25-8 
(collecting cases). In particular, many “foreign-cubed” cases—those 
brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for conduct that 
occurred on foreign soil—have been dismissed post Kiobel.  Id. at 26-8. 
17. See Foreign Relations Law — Alien Tort Statute — Fourth Circuit 
Allows Alien Tort Statute Claim Against Abu Ghraib Contractor. – Al 
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 
2014), 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1534 (2015) (discussing Al Shimari v. CACI 
Premier Technology, Inc., 758 F3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014)).  
18. Childress, supra note 12, at 728-30.  The Supreme Court’s decisions on 
general personal jurisdiction have also taken a toll on human rights 
litigation.  See Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Transnational Corporations for Federal Causes of 
Action, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 617, 634-56 (2017) (collecting cases that 
reflect the modern development of the ATS). 
19. John B. Bellinger III & R. Reeves Anderson, As Kiobel Turns Two: 
How the Supreme Court is Leaving the Details to Lower Courts, 2015 
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 1, 1, 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Kiobel_v6.pdf 
[perma.cc/A92V-FQCL]. 
20. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117, 145 
(2d Cir. 2010), aff’d other grounds, 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013) 
(rejecting corporate liability under the ATS) with Doe I v. Nestle USA, 
Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014), reh’s denied, 788 F.3d 946, 
946 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming earlier circuit precedent finding no 
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The judicial decisions restricting the availability of the ATS 
reflect concerns about the judiciary’s institutional competence and the 
proper allocation of authority within the federal constitutional system.  
Influential scholars have argued that the judicial development of 
international law norms without the clear sanction of and direction 
from the political branches violates the constitutional principles of 
federalism and separation of powers.22 One scholar summed up the 
current state of affairs:  
[T]here appears to be federal-court recognition that either 
Congress is unconcerned with activities occurring abroad absent 
clear statutory language expressing such a concern, or that 
courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate such cases even though 
they may have subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. These 
legal concerns dovetail with other public-policy concerns that 
courts may be taking [into] account . . . .23 
These decisions are relevant to the present discussion for two 
reasons.  First, litigants who can no longer rely on the ATS are 
seeking alterative ground for their claims, and in some cases they 
have turned to the TVPA.24 That pressure will intensify if the 
Supreme Court concludes that the ATS is not applicable to 
corporations. Second, the judicial attitudes that undergirded the cases 
construing the ATS may affect the courts’ construction of the TVPA. 
II. The TVPA: new options 
The TVPA had its origins in the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act, which was enacted in 2000.25 The Act’s two 
primary purposes were “[t]o combat trafficking in persons, especially 
into the sex trade, slavery, and involuntary servitude, [and] to 
 
legitimate reason for a complete bar on corporate liability under the 
ATS). 
21. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 16-499, cert. granted (April 3, 2017), 
argued (Oct. 10, 2017). 
22. See Childress, supra note 12, at 710, 719-21, 726-27 (describing the 
scholarly debate). 
23. Id. at 736. 
24. See Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 (5th Cir. 
2017) and  Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 324-5 (2d. Cir. 2012) 
(demonstrating how early efforts to rely on the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under the TVPA failed because the courts held that the 
TVPA’s grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction did not apply 
retroactively). 
25. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). 
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reauthorize certain Federal programs to prevent violence against 
women.”26 The provisions of the Act dealing with human trafficking 
have been widely known as the TVPA.27 Several features of the 
original legislation are significant from the perspective of international 
human rights litigation.  Pairing criminal provisions with provisions 
authorizing funding—which require periodic reauthorization—
prompted Congress to return to the topic of human trafficking at 
regular intervals and expand the reach of the TVPA.  Often, the 
groups lobbying for funding and their supporters in Congress and the 
executive branch used funding legislation as an occasion to make 
substantive changes intended to strengthen the TVPA. Second, the 
trafficking legislation enjoyed bipartisan (and often near-universal) 
support. Perhaps for that reason, congress enacted the changes 
intended to strengthen the TVPA with little scrutiny. Unfortunately, 
the resulting legislation contained some serious flaws. 
A. Labor trafficking and the origins of the TVPA 
Although Congress’s primary concern has been sex trafficking 
(especially that involving children), from the outset the TVPA 
offenses also included forced labor and trafficking with respect to 
forced labor.28  Widespread media coverage and NGO activity 
following a 1995 investigation in El Monte, California helped to 
galvanize support for the TVPA.29 Seventy-two Thai workers had 
been forced to live and work making garments in a compound 
surrounded by a barbed wire fence; some had been held there for as 
long as seven years.30 In 2000, an unclassified report on human 
trafficking written by a State Department analyst under the auspices 
of the Central Intelligence Agency provided a broader perspective, 
including a statistical analysis of people being trafficked in the United 
 
26. Id.  
27. See, e.g., Remedying the Injustices of Human Trafficking Through Tort 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2574, 2574–5 (2006) [hereinafter Remedying 
Injustices]; Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a 
Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the 
Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 337, 338 (2007).  Some courts and commentators refer to the 
portions of the TVPA added by later amendments as the TVPRA, but 
for simplicity this essay will use refer throughout to the TVPA.  
28. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-90 (2008) (prohibiting forced labor and trafficking 
with respect to forced labor). 
29. Kevin Bales, Laurel Fletcher & Eric Stover, Hidden Slaves Forced Labor 
in the United States, 23 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 47, 57 (2005) [hereinafter 
Hidden Slaves]. 
30. Id. 
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States.31 Both events contributed to the TVPA’s initial passage.32 The 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act—including the 
TVPA—enjoyed near-universal Congressional support.33  
B. Broadening the TVPA 
The linkage of program funding and substantive provisions 
provided an opportunity for multiple changes in the substantive 
provisions of the TVPA.34 Periodic consideration of legislation 
authorizing the allocation of funds35 created regular opportunities for 
public interest groups and law enforcement agencies to advocate for 
substantive changes to the TVPA.36  Several of the amendments 
adopted in the periodic reauthorization process added features better 
adapting the TVPA as a mechanism to impose liability on 
corporations for human rights violations. 
 
31. Remedying Injustices, supra note 27, at 2574 (citing AMY O’NEILL 
RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, INTERNATIONAL 
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY 
MANIFESTATION OF SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 3 (2000), available 
at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/books-and-monographs/trafficking.pdf [perma.cc/CKP6-
DGQP]). 
32. Hidden Slaves, supra note 29, at 57. 
33. H.R.3244 - Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-
bill/3244/all-actions?overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-
vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D [perma.cc/7GEG-VY6Y]. The Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 was sponsored by 
Representative Christopher Smith, a Republican from New Jersey, who 
secured 36 cosponsors, 19 Republicans and 17 Democrats. Less than a 
year after its introduction, the bill passed the House (371-1) and the 
Senate (95-0). Id.  
34. Every version of the TVPA has provided funding only for a limited 
number of future years. The 2000 Reauthorization provided funding 
through fiscal year 2002. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). The 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Reauthorization] 
provided funding through fiscal year 2005. The Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 
3558 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Reauthorization] provided funding through 
fiscal year 2007. 
35. Compare Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-386, §113, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (appropriating “the 
Attorney General $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2001 and $10,000,000 for 
fiscal year 2002”) with 2003 Reauthorization, at § 7 (appropriating the 
Attorney General “$5,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2004 and 
2005”). 
36. See 2003 Reauthorization § 7 (amending the TVPA). 
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From the perspective of corporate liability, critical amendments in 
2003 and 2008 (1) created an offense of benefitting from forced labor,37 
(2) authorized extraterritorial jurisdiction over TVPA offenses,38 and 
(3) authorized a civil cause of action for victims39 as well as 
mandatory restitution40 and forfeiture.41  Like the initial legislation in 
2000, these amendments received strong bipartisan support in 
Congress, 42 and they sailed through Congress with little dispute, or 
even scrutiny.43 
C. Relevant offenses 
As amended, the TVPA creates six new offenses: (1) forced 
labor,44 (2) benefitting financially from forced labor, (3) trafficking 
with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced 
labor,45 (4) sex trafficking and benefitting from sex trafficking of 
children,46 (5) unlawful conduct with respect to related documents,47 
 
37. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5068 (amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1589) [hereinafter Wilberforce Act]. 
38. Id. at 5071 (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1596).  
39. 2003 Reauthorization, supra note 34 at 2878 (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 
1595); Wilberforce Act, supra note 37 at 5067 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 
1589).  
40. Wilberforce Act, supra note 37 at 5067 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1593). 
41. Id. (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1593). 
42. Representative Smith sponsored the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2003, which passed the House, 422-1, and passed 
the Senate by unanimous consent. All Information (Except Text) for 
H.R.2620 - Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-
bill/2620/all-info?r=1 [perma.cc/YY88-KQ3Y] [hereinafter Information 
for 2003 Reauthorization]. Representative Howard Berman, a Democrat 
from California, sponsored the 2008 Reauthorization. Representative 
Smith was a cosponsor, along with two other Republicans and three 
Democrats. The legislation passed the House without objection and 
Senate with unanimous consent. All Information (Except Text) for 
H.R.7311 - William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/7311/all-
info?r=1 [perma.cc/5KTK-3L6L] [hereinafter Information for 
Wilberforce Act].  
43. Information for 2003 Reauthorization, supra note 42; Information for 
Wilberforce Act, supra note 42.  
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008).  
45. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (2008).  
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2008). 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1592 (2008). 
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and (6) benefitting financially from other TVPA offenses.48  The new 
offenses were added to Chapter 77 of Title 18, supplementing  
Reconstruction-era offenses such as peonage,49 sale into involuntary 
servitude,50 and various offenses concerning slavery.51 
1. Forced labor and trafficking with respect to forced labor 
The forced labor and trafficking offenses cover a wide range of 
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) defines the forced labor offense to 
include knowingly providing or obtaining the labor or services of a 
person by any of the following means (or “any combination” of them):   
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or 
threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; 
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that 
person or another person; 
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal 
process; or 
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause 
the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such 
labor or services, that person or another person would suffer 
serious harm or physical restraint . . . . 52 
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 defines trafficking to include 
“knowingly” recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or 
obtaining “by any means, any person for labor or services in violation 
of this chapter.”53  This encompasses not only trafficking forced labor 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1589, but also the peonage, slavery, and 
servitude offenses in Chapter 77. 
2. Benefitting from forced labor and trafficking 
From the perspective of potential corporate liability, it is 
significant that liability for forced labor and trafficking reaches not 
 
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1593A (2008). Although this statute’s caption is 
“Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in 
persons,” see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text, there is a 
mismatch between the caption and the conduct covered in the body of 
the statute.  
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000). 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012). 
51. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1585-88 (offenses include seizure, detention, or sale of 
slaves; service on vessels in slave trade; possession of slaves aboard 
vessel; and transportation of slaves from United States). 
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)-(4) (2008). 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a) (2008). 
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only those who commit the offenses defined by the TVPA, but also 
certain parties who benefit from the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 1589(b), 
added in 2008, extends liability to anyone who 
. . . knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of 
value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the 
providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of the means 
described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless disregard of 
the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or 
obtaining of labor or services by any of such means . . . .54 
3. Benefitting from other TVPA violations 
18 U.S.C. § 1593A has a similar structure, criminalizing the 
knowing receipt of a financial benefit or thing of value “from 
participation in a venture” with knowledge or reckless disregard that 
the venture has engaged in other TVPA violations.55  Although the 
caption indicates this provision extends liability for benefitting from 
the trafficking of persons,56 as discussed below it may not reach some 
of the conduct referred to in the caption.57  
D. Civil remedies, forfeiture, and restitution 
The TVPA also provides a range of remedies for the victims of 
the offenses defined in Chapter 77, including the Reconstruction-era 
offenses and those defined by the TVPA. Taken together, these 
provisions provide victims with an incentive to report violations, 
cooperate with criminal investigations, and bring civil actions in the 
absence of criminal prosecution. 
The TVPA provides for mandatory restitution of “the full amount 
of the victim’s losses,” including “the greater of the gross income or 
value to the defendant of the victim’s services or labor or the value of 
the victim’s labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and 
overtime guarantees of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201 
et seq.).”58 
The civil remedy, included in the 2003 reauthorization, provides 
that any victim of an offense under Chapter 77 may “bring a civil 
action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, 
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a 
venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in 
 
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008).  
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1593A (2008).  
56. See id. (“Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking in 
persons.”).  
57. See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.  
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1593(a)(3) (2008). 
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an act in violation of this chapter).”59  The civil remedy includes 
“damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.”60 The civil action is subject 
to the restriction that it “shall be stayed during the pendency of any 
criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the 
claimant is the victim.”61 The statute defines criminal action broadly 
to include “investigation and prosecution . . . until final adjudication 
in the trial court.”62   
This provision offers several advantages. First, although the 
TVPA already provided for victims to receive restitution through 
criminal proceedings,63 they may seek a civil remedy when prosecutors 
do not file charges. Second, it empowers victims to personally 
confront their victimizers in court.64 Third, the damages awarded in 
civil cases may additionally deter human trafficking.65  However, as 
noted, any civil action will be stayed if there is an ongoing criminal 
prosecution, or even just an investigation.  
Finally, the TVPA requires mandatory criminal forfeiture of the 
proceeds of the offense and property used to facilitate the offense, and 
it directs the Attorney General to transfer forfeited assets and 
proceeds to satisfy victim restitution under its provisions.66  
Restitution has priority over all other claims.67 
E. Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
The 2008 amendments to the TVPA added language expressly 
providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the new trafficking 
offenses as well as some of the Reconstruction-era offenses.68  In 
addition to domestic or territorial jurisdictional otherwise available, it 
adds extraterritorial jurisdiction over the enumerated offenses (and 
attempts and conspiracies to commit them) whenever:  
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms 
are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or 
 
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015).  
60. Id. 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (2015).  
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(2) (2015). 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2008).  
64. Remedying Injustices, supra note 27, at 2585. 
65. Id. 
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(d)-(f) (2015).  
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(f)(2) (2015).  
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a)(2) (2008).  
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(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, 
irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender.69 
However, this jurisdiction has an unusual limitation on dual 
prosecutions. If another foreign government is prosecuting a person 
“for the conduct constituting the offense,” a U.S. prosecution under 
the TVPA may not be brought without “the approval of the Attorney 
General or the Deputy Attorney General (or a person acting in either 
such capacity), which function of approval may not be delegated.”70 
F. Cases that do—and do not—fall within the TVPA 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the TVPA cannot reach 
the wide range of cases that were brought under the ATS prior to the 
Supreme Court’s limiting decisions.  For example, in Kiobel, Nigerian 
nationals residing in United States sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
corporations pursuant to Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Plaintiffs alleged 
that corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria, including 
aiding and abetting atrocities including attacking villages, where they 
beat, raped, killed, and arrested residents, and destroyed or looted 
property.71 The plaintiffs in Filártiga were Paraguayan nationals who 
sought relief from a citizen of Paraguay for wrongfully causing the 
death of their son by the use of torture. 72 Neither case would fall 
within the TVPA, which focuses exclusively on offenses related to 
forced labor, including sex and labor trafficking. 
But the TVPA may provide a remedy—and define crimes—for 
conduct alleged in other cases originally brought under the ATS. For 
example, in Doe v. Nestle SA,73 a class action, Malian plaintiffs 
alleged that they were trafficked as young children into the Ivory 
Coast to harvest and grow cocoa beans.74 These farms sold the cocoa 
to the defendants, Nestle, Cargill, and Archer Daniels Midland.75 The 
plaintiffs’ accounts of their treatment are similar.76 They worked 12 to 
 
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2008).  
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(b) (2008) (applying only to situations where the 
foreign government is acting “in accordance with jurisdiction recognized 
by the United States….”).  
71. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 111–113 (2013). 
72. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
73. Doe v. Nestle SA, 748 F.Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  
74. Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶ 1, 
Doe v. Nestle SA, 748 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D. Cal 2010) (No. CV 05-
5133-SVM-MRW). 
75. Id. 
76. See id. at ¶¶ 57-59. 
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14 hour days six days a week and were unpaid.77 They faced corporal 
punishment for attempted escapes.78 The class includes everyone 
forced to labor on the farms in several named regions of Ivory Coast.79 
The complaint further alleges that Ivory Coast’s “cocoa hierarchy” 
benefits from an “Enron-type structure” through which secret bank 
accounts and front companies insulate beneficiaries.80 Approximately 
70% of the world’s cocoa supply comes from the Ivory Coast, and a 
majority of the U.S.’s cocoa supply comes from these three 
defendants.81 All three defendants regularly sent employees from 
headquarters to inspect operations in the Ivory Coast.82 The 
companies entered exclusive buyer-seller relationships with different 
farms.83 Through these agreements, the complaint alleges, the 
companies had the power to set labor standards, which would have 
prevented the alleged abuse.84  
The complaint in Doe v. Nestle SA shows the potential of the 
TVPA’s civil cause of action to reach certain forms of human rights 
violations in corporate supply chains.  Nestle is a Swiss company.85 
Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland are American.86 Plaintiffs sued 
both the parent companies and subsidiaries of Nestle (Nestle S.A., 
Nestle U.S.A., and Nestle Cote d’Ivoire)87 and Cargill (Cargill, Inc., 
Cargill Cocoa, and Cargill West Africa).88 The allegations might 
support civil or criminal liability under the TVPA on at least two 
theories: (1) the defendants knowingly benefitted from participation in 
a venture including the plaintiffs’ forced labor, knowingly or in 
reckless disregard of the means used, and (2) the defendants aided 
and abetted the labor trafficking that brought plaintiffs to the farms 
where plaintiffs were held against their will and forced to work. 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at ¶ 11. 
80. Id. at ¶ 31. 
81. Id. at ¶ 32. 
82. Id. at ¶¶ 34. 
83. Id. at ¶ 34-35. 
84. Id at ¶¶ 35-44.  
85. Id. at ¶ 18. 
86. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. 
87. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. 
88. Id. at ¶¶ 22-24. 
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III. Drafting problems and key unknowns 
A. The scope of the forced labor and benefit offenses 
Although some case law is developing on the question what 
constitutes forced labor under subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 1589,89 
two key phrases in subsection (b) have critical importance in cases 
involving corporate responsibility for forced labor: (1) benefitting 
financially and (2) participation in a venture. To date, these issues 
have received virtually no attention from the courts. 
1. Benefitting 
Section 1589 proscribes “benefit[ting] financially by receiving 
anything of value.”90 The statute does not define benefitting.91  In the 
context of forced labor, the core of the definition seems fairly clear.  
For example, in the case of the conduct alleged in Doe v. Nestle SA, 
the concept of benefit should include purchasing cocoa for a lower 
price because forced labor reduced the cost of production. The 
 
89. See, e.g., Muchira v. Al_Rawaf, 850 F.3d 605, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(“Typically, therefore, “forced labor” situations involve circumstances 
such as squalid or otherwise intolerable living conditions, extreme 
isolation (from family and the outside world), threats of inflicting harm 
upon the victim or others (including threats of legal process such as 
arrest or deportation), and exploitation of the victim’s lack of education 
and familiarity with the English language, all of which are “used to 
prevent [vulnerable] victims from leaving and to keep them bound to 
their captors.”) (quoting United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 619 
(6th Cir. 2015) and collecting cases).  Many of the cases are fact-bound 
discussion by district courts ruling on pretrial motion to dismiss. See, 
e.g., Echon v. Sackett, No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW, 2017 WL 4181417 
at *13-16 (finding allegations of forced labor sufficient to deny, in part, 
motion to dismiss); Stein v. World-Wide Plumbing Supply Inc., 71 F. 
Supp. 3d 320, 327-29 (E.D. N.Y. 2014) (claiming that plaintiff was 
forced to work as monitor, not paid, and defendants benefitted sufficient 
to survive motion to dismiss claim of forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 
1589, but not to state a claim for peonage enticement into slavery).  
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (2008).  
91. Section 1589(b) does require that a defendant knowingly benefit 
“financially or by receiving anything of value.”  Although the phrase 
“anything of value” is not defined, it is similar to the phrase “thing of 
value,” which is used in many federal criminal statutes and generally 
defined broadly to include both tangible and intangible benefits, 
including anything of subjective value to the recipient. NORMAN 
ABRAMS, SARA BEALE, & SUSAN KLEIN., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 190–92 (6th ed. 2015).  The issue was raised in a case 
involving both forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 and sex trafficking 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, and the court construed the phrase in 
accordance with these general principles.  Riccio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 
553, 556 (1st Cir. 2017).  Accord United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983, 
988-89 (8th Cir. 2015) (same in sex trafficking case under § 1591). 
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question is whether “benefit[]” should be read to be extend 
substantially further. 
Many transactions involve intermediaries, and it may be desirable 
to interpret the concept of benefit more broadly to reach farther along 
the supply chain. As an economic matter, Nestle would benefit from 
forced labor and lower production costs whether it purchased cocoa 
directly from the farmers who cut costs by using forced labor, or from 
a middleman who purchased the cocoa from the same farms. It would 
undercut the goals of the TVPA to allow producers like Nestle to 
insulate themselves from liability simply by introducing an 
intermediary, rather than sending their own purchasing agents into 
the field. Assuming courts accept this line of reasoning, what if there 
are multiple intermediaries and transactions between the farmers and 
Nestle? Assuming the other statutory requirements are met, including 
knowledge or reckless disregard of the use of forced labor, would two, 
or three, or more intervening transactions break the benefit chain? If 
the benefit chain extends through multiple transactions, note that the 
final step in the chain is the consumer. American consumers clearly 
do benefit financially from the lower prices that result from forced 
labor in multiple industries.  But it seems far-fetched to say that the 
TVPA should be construed to impose criminal liability on consumers 
who purchased Nestle chocolate bars if they were aware of media 
reports demonstrating that the cocoa originated in farms employing 
forced labor, and hence arguably acting with reckless disregard.92   
In the alternative, courts could interpret benefit to focus on the 
producer’s ability to gain a competitive advantage in U.S. consumer 
markets by reducing the cost of ingredients. This theory would have 
at least two advantages: it would not extend to consumers and it 
might have jurisdictional significance. Note that if the receipt of the 
benefit occurs where the sale is made, outside the United States, it 
would seem to require extraterritorial jurisdiction. In contrast, the 
competitive advantage, and resulting “benefit,” would occur in the 
United States.  
2. Participation in a venture 
Section 1589 requires that the benefit be obtained “from 
participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or 
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in 
 
92. But cf. Rachael Revesz, Nestle is being sued for allegedly using child 
slaves on cocoa farms, INDEPENDENT, July 11, 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/nestle-is-being-
sued-for-allegedly-using-child-slaves-on-cocoa-farms-a6806646.html 
[perma.cc/7MYG-R96S] (quoting policy director at campaign group at 
International Baby Food Action, who stated, “‘Every time you eat their 
chocolate you are benefitting from child slavery.’”). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
The Trafficking Victim Protection Act 
33 
subsection (a).”93  The lack of any statutory definition of the terms 
“participation” and “venture” is problematic, because even their core 
meaning in this context is uncertain.94 
There is one plausible statutory source of a definition of 
“venture,” but it raises a series of problems. The TVPA sex 
trafficking provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(5), provides a definition of 
the term, but only for “this section.” Section 1591(c)(5) provides that 
“[t]he term ‘venture’ means any group of two or more individuals 
associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.”95  If Congress had 
intended this definition to apply throughout the TVPA (or at least to 
§ 1589 as well as § 1591), it would have been easy to say so. Indeed, 
one could argue that the textual limitation makes it clear that the 
definition in § 1591(c)(5) was not intended to apply to cases under § 
1589. But Supreme Court precedent suggests that it would be proper 
to carry the definition over.96 In construing RICO’s pattern 
requirement, the Supreme Court considered and rejected a similar 
argument made by Justice Scalia, consulting a definition contained in 
another section of the legislation and not referenced in RICO itself.97   
Assuming that courts consult § 1591(c)(5) when construing § 
1589, they will encounter a new set of difficulties. Section 1591(c)(5)’s 
“associated in fact” language tracks, in part, RICO’s definition of the 
term “enterprise.”98 The courts have struggled to define the term 
under the RICO statute, generating an extensive body of case law 
 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008). 
94. See Riccio v. McClean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017) (reversing the 
dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim, the court emphasized 
plaintiff’s allegations that motel owners, who resided at their motel, 
knew their long term tenant was physically abusing plaintiff and forcing 
her to have sex in the motel room, and were associated with tenant’s 
efforts to force the plaintiff to engage in sex for money). 
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5) (2008). 
96. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1989) (drawing 
on definition of “pattern” in another title of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, which also included RICO and not included in 
RICO), id. at 251, 252 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that when 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it from another section of the same statute, it is “generally 
presumed Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 
23 (1983)). 
97. Id.  
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2016) (“‘enterprise’ includes any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity . . . .”). 
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defining criteria for groups of individuals deemed to be associated in 
fact for this purpose.99   
Whether the courts will consider decisions construing RICO as 
applicable to this language in the TVPA remains unclear. RICO 
raises distinctive policy concerns that undergird decisions seeking to 
impose limitations, and these concerns may not apply to TVPA 
litigation.  The first concern reflected in the RICO cases is that the 
powerful incentives arising from the availability of treble damage and 
attorneys’ fees could swamp the courts with civil cases that bear little 
or no relation to the concerns that animated Congress in enacting 
RICO.100 This concern does not apply to the TVPA, which does not 
provide for trebled damages. The second concern arises from the 
courts’ search for criteria that meaningfully distinguish RICO 
violations—with large additional penalties—from garden-variety 
conspiracies (themselves associations in fact).101 Again, this concern 
does not directly apply to the definition of “venture” under the 
TVPA, because the elements of the TVPA clearly distinguish it from 
a garden-variety conspiracy. Because of its mens rea terms, the TVPA 
benefit offense is broader than (and hence statutorily distinct from) a 
conspiracy to commit forced labor violations.102 The TVPA benefit 
offense requires only that the defendant knowingly benefit with at 
least recklessness with regard to the venture’s use of forced labor.103 In 
contrast, conspirators must have the specific intent to promote the 
conspiracy’s object (such as the forced labor offenses).104 Although the 
 
99. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) (concluding that a 
RICO enterprise composed of a individuals “associated in fact” must 
have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among 
those associated, and longevity; but rejecting arguments that must have 
structural features such as hierarchy, role differentiation, and a chain of 
command), and Abrams, supra note 91, at 890–96 (reviewing issues 
arising in construing associated-in-fact enterprises cases following Boyle). 
100. Abrams, supra note 91, at 875 (discussing expressions of judicial 
concerns about the frequent inclusion of RICO claims in ordinary 
business disputes and judicial “glosses” intended to make it more 
difficult to bring RICO claims).  
101. Id. at 940. 
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008). 
103. Id.  
104. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 432–34 (6th ed. 
2012) (noting the question whether this requires purpose, or knowledge 
of the object offense suffices). Of course a person or entity benefitting 
from forced labor could also conspire to violate the forced labor statute 
by entering into an agreement with those committing the labor 
violations with the requisite specific intent. 18 U.S.C. § 1594(b) makes it 
an offense to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and provides that the 
conspiracy carries the same punishment as the object offense. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1594(b) (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008). 
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mens rea requirement distinguishes the TVPA from RICO, the 
comparison with conspiracy law highlights the potential breadth of 
the TVPA benefit offenses. Indeed, some courts might consider the 
TVPA’s low mens rea as a factor supporting a narrow construction of 
the term venture. 
The statute also lacks a definition of participation. What does it 
mean to “participate in a venture”?  Courts might construe this term 
to place an effective limitation on the meaning of benefit in this 
context. If there are multiple intermediaries between the 
manufacturers and the farms on which forced labor occurs, does the 
manufacturer participate in the venture of the farm?  Although the 
text provides no guide, intuitively the answer seems to be that it does 
not.  However, the RICO litigation suggests that the adept drafting of 
complaints and indictments may cast the same facts in a very 
different light.105 Perhaps the venture is not merely the farm, but 
rather should be understood more broadly as those who run the farm 
and some of the intermediaries, especially if they are repeat players. 
This understanding of participation in a venture would eliminate the 
incentive to create intermediate entities merely to cut off liability, and 
it would also be broadly consistent with the current practice of 
creating multinational supply chains over which U.S. producers exert 
substantial oversight and control. For example, Apple’s suppliers 
employ millions of people worldwide, and Apple itself claims 
responsibility to “protect the rights of all the people in [its] supply 
chain. . . .”106 In upholding this responsibility, Apple has a supplier 
code of conduct containing standards for “safe working conditions 
[and] fair treatment of workers . . . .”107 Apple states publicly that it 
conducts “regular assessments” to test employer compliance with its 
code of conduct.108 
B. Drafting error and omissions in 18 U.S.C. § 1593A 
18 U.S.C. § 1593A has even more serious drafting problems. Like 
the benefit offense in § 1589(b), Congress added § 1593A in 2008.109  
It appears that Congress intended to create a benefit offense broadly 
applicable to the other sections of the TVPA. Section 1593A’s caption 
refers to “Benefitting financially from peonage, slavery, and trafficking 
in persons,” and it proscribes knowingly benefitting from participation 
 
105. See Abrams, supra note 91, at 897–901 (describing alternative ways of 
defining an enterprise based on the same facts).  
106. APPLE, Supplier Responsibility, https://www.apple.com/ae/supplier-
responsibility/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Wilberforce Act, supra note 37; 18 U.S.C. § 1593A (2008).  
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in a venture engaging in certain violations, with knowledge or reckless 
disregard of the venture’s violations. It lists three sections: 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1581(a), 1592, and 1595. Surprisingly, however, only one of the 
listed sections conforms to the caption. Section 1581(a) proscribes 
peonage. But neither section 1592 nor 1595 refers to either slavery or 
trafficking. To the contrary, 18 U.S.C. § 1592 proscribes only unlawful 
conduct with respect to certain documents, such as passports, in 
connection with offenses under Chapter 77. And 18 U.S.C. § 1595 
contains no criminal offense; it creates the civil cause of action for 
victims of TVPA violations.  There is no question that this was 
simply a drafting error.110   
The drafting error appears to leave a gap in the statutory scheme. 
Although 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1593A, and 18 U.S.C. § 
1591(a)(2) impose liability for benefitting from forced labor, peonage, 
and sex trafficking, no comparable provision imposes criminal liability 
for benefitting from labor trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a). 
Moreover, the gap in criminal liability creates an equivalent gap in 
civil liability.111 
Although courts occasionally rely on the doctrine of the 
scrivener’s error as support for construing a statute or rule in 
conformity with the drafter’s clear intent,112 the courts should not 
employ that doctrine to close the gap in § 1593A. The precise result 
intended by Congress is not clear,113 and in any event new criminal 
 
110. For a discussion on lacking criminal provisions in the Wilberforce Act, 
see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40190, THE WILLIAM 
WILBERFORCE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION 
ACT OF 2008 (P.L. 110-457): CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS (2009). 
111. Lagasan v. Al-Ghasel, 92 F. Supp. 3d 445, 449, 454-55 (E.D. Va. 2015) 
(holding a default judgment for a civil claim based on the assumption 
that § 1593A created an offense of knowingly benefitting from violations 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1584 and 1590, which are not included in the text of § 
1593A).  
112. See United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting the 
analysis in United States v. Rudolph, 224 F.R.D. 503, 504-11 (N.D. Ala. 
2004) where the court rejected a literal reading of restyled Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 16(a) because it would go far beyond a stylistic change, altering the 
scope of the protection afforded to government work product).  
113. There are a variety of possibilities as to Congress’ intention in drafting § 
1593A. While the inclusion of § 1595 is clearly in error, it is less certain 
that § 1592 was included in error, as it does proscribe misuse of 
documents related to trafficking and slavery. It is additionally unclear 
which statute(s) Congress intended to include in lieu of any errors. 
However, this alone does not necessarily bring the text of § 1593A in 
line with its caption, since § 1592 does not go to “slavery” in general. It 
is possible that § 1592 should have been § 1584 (prohibiting involuntary 
servitude). There is only minimal support for any one interpretation of 
Congress’ intent for § 1593A over another. Doyle, supra note 110, at 9 
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liability should not be recognized in the absence of a properly enacted 
act of Congress. To do so would create a common law crime.114 
C.  Applicability of the TVPA offenses and civil liability to 
corporations 
Although the defendants in Doe v. Nestle SA moved to dismiss on 
the grounds, inter alia, that the TVPA offenses and civil cause of 
action do not apply to corporations,115 that argument seems unlikely 
to succeed. Federal criminal statutes such as the TVPA are generally 
applicable to corporations. The Dictionary Act defines commonly used 
terms throughout the United States Code and by its terms provides: 
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ or ‘whoever’ 
include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, 
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”116 
Courts have relied on the Dictionary Act’s inclusive definition to 
give meaning to the words “person” or “whoever” in the context of 
criminal statutes.117 Although some federal regulatory statutes do 
specifically include corporations as being subject to the law,118 the 
Dictionary Act provides the default rule that a statute need not 
specifically include terms extending liability to corporations. Section 
1589’s prohibitions on forced labor and benefitting from forced labor 
ventures both apply to “[w]hoever” engages in the prohibited 
conduct.”119 In conformity with the Dictionary Act, these provisions 
should be held to apply to corporations (and other legal entities) as 
well as natural persons. 
 
(suggesting that Congress intended to refer to § 1590 (trafficking more 
generally) when drafting § 1593A).  
114. Cf. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812) (holding that there are 
no federal common law crimes).  
115. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendants Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Co.; Nestle, U.S.A.,; and Cargill, Inc. to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim upon 
which Relief can be Granted: Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 
19–22, Doe v. Nestle SA, 748 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. CV 
05-5133-SVM-MRW). 
116. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
117. See e.g., A&P Trucking Co., 358 US at 123 (addressing corporate 
violation of Interstate Commerce Commission safety regulations); see 
also Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 454-55 (2012) 
(citing the Dictionary Act and contrasting use of term “individual,” 
which refers to natural persons, with the terms persons and whoever, 
which generally refer to corporations as well as natural persons). 
118. See, e.g., 15 USC § 78(c)(a)(1), (9) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 321(e) (2012). 
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)-(b) (2012). 
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It seems equally clear that the TVPA provision authorizing civil 
damages should apply to corporations that have violated the criminal 
provisions of the act. Looking first to the text, § 1595(a) gives no hint 
that the cause of action is limited to natural persons. It authorizes the 
victim to bring a civil cause of action against “the perpetrator” of a 
violation as well as “whoever knowingly benefits . . . .”120 If a 
corporation has violated the forced labor offense it is a “perpetrator,” 
and if it knowingly benefits in violation of § 1589(b) it would fall 
within the second clause of § 1595(a). Sound policy also supports this 
result.  There is no reason to shield corporate—but not individual—
defendants from civil liability based on their criminal conduct.  
Construing the TVPA to exempt corporations from liability would 
significantly undermine the goal of making the victims of forced labor 
crimes whole, since corporate defendants are more likely than 
individuals to have the funds necessary to pay the victim’s damages, 
plus attorneys’ fees. 
Although the issue has not arisen in TVPA criminal prosecutions, 
the TVPA’s civil provisions have been used successfully against 
corporations. In one such case, Filipino teachers sued the recruiting 
agency that fraudulently induced them to participate by not revealing 
large fees they would have to pay later, held their visas and passports, 
and threatened them with deportation when they complained about 
poor treatment.121 The district court held that the complaint stated a 
claim for violations of forced labor and other TVPA offenses,122 and it 
certified approximately 250 teachers as a class.123  In another case, 
detainees at a for-profit immigration detention center successfully 
sued the management company under the TVPA for threatening 
them with solitary confinement in the event they failed to complete 
particular, unpaid chores.124 The plaintiffs succeeded, and the case 
confirmed that the TVPA covers all forced labor, even labor 
performed by those who are not being trafficked.125 Neither case 
explicitly considered whether the TVPA was applicable to artificial 
entities. 
On the other hand, a few courts have ruled that government 
entities cannot be sued for TVPA violations. In a case brought 
against the University of Oklahoma, the court ruled that the TVPA 
 
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015). 
121. Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., 790 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1145 
(C.D. Cal. 2011). 
122. Id. at 1143-48. 
123. Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., No. LA CV10-01172 JAK, 2011 
WL 7095434, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011). 
124. Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc, 113 F.Supp.3d 1125, 1128 (D. Colo. 2015).  
125. Id. at 1132–33.  
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did not abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity.126 A district court 
took a different tack, relying on the language of the TVPA and the 
Dictionary Act to conclude that § 1595 does not authorize relief 
against a government entity, such as a local school board.127 
D. Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
Although Congress expressly provided for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over the new TVPA offenses, the statutory language 
leaves open two important questions: (1) whether (and under what 
circumstances) corporations are subject to extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction, and (2) whether the TVPA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction 
extends to civil actions. The answer to these questions will help 
determine whether the TVPA can be employed to close part of the 
gap left by the Supreme Court’s decisions limiting the reach of the 
ATS.   
Unfortunately, the sparse legislative history provides virtually no 
guidance on these questions.  The jurisdictional provision received 
little attention when the 2008 amendments were enacted.  The House 
Report regarding the 2008 Reauthorization included “facilitating 
extraterritorial prosecutions against international trafficking 
criminals” in its list of “[k]ey provisions relating to combatting 
trafficking in the United States,”128 but it provides no further 
information on the scope of the jurisdictional provisions.129  Congress 
seems to have modeled § 1596(a) on the jurisdictional provisions 
governing genocide prosecutions,130 but no court has considered the 
question of its applicability to corporations under either statute. 
Thus, this analysis will focus on the text, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions construing another similar term and 
considering the extraterritorial application of other laws.131 
 
126. Mojsilovic v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Univ. of Okla., 841 F.3d 
1129, 1131-33 (10th Cir. 2016). 
127. Nunag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., No. SACV 10-1172-AG 
(MLGx), 2011 WL 13153190 at *10-12 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). 
128. H.R. Rep. No. 110-430, pt. 1, at 35 (2007). 
129. The only other reference to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the report 
comes in the section by section analysis, which states that section 22 of 
the bill “provides jurisdiction for U.S. courts for prosecution of certain 
slavery and trafficking offenses committed abroad.”  Id. at 55. 
130. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2012) (stating the genocide jurisdictional 
provisions were enacted the year before the TVPA provisions, and the 
language is virtually identical), with 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2) (2012) 
(showing that genocide provisions do include some bases of jurisdiction 
that are not present in the TVPA—offenses “committed in whole or 
part in the United States,” and offenses allegedly committed by “a 
stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States.”). 
131. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). 
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1. Applicability to corporations and other entities 
The grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction enacted in 2008 extends 
to TVPA offenses (including forced labor and benefitting from forced 
labor) if: 
(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as those terms 
are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)); or 
(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, 
irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender.132 
Under subdivision (1), the critical term is “national.” If a 
corporation is incorporated in the United States, or has its principal 
place of business here, is it a “national of the United States” under 
subsection (1)?  Or are nationals—like permanent resident aliens—
necessarily individuals? Judged by the standards recently applied by 
the Supreme Court, it appears that a corporation is a United States 
national if it is incorporated in the United States, and perhaps also if 
it has its principal place of business here.133  
In Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority134 the Court considered the 
question whether the statutory term “individual” includes 
corporations under the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991,135 and 
its decision provides guidance for analysis of the term “national” in 
the TVPA. The Court turned first to multiple dictionaries to 
determine the ordinary meaning of the term; it concluded that, when 
used as a noun, “‘individual’ ordinarily means ‘[a] human being, a 
person.’”136   
In contrast, according to similar sources, the ordinary meaning of 
the term “national” is not limited to human beings. For example, one 
leading dictionary defines “national” as “a citizen or subject of a 
particular nation who is entitled to its protection.”137 This seems 
broad enough to encompass domestic corporations because they are 
statutorily deemed to be U.S. citizens for some purposes, and they are 
entitled to claim the protection of the United States and its laws.  
The federal statutes governing diversity jurisdiction and removal 
 
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a). 
133. Mohamad, 566 U.S. 449. 
134. Id.  
135. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 
73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 and accompanying note (2012)). 
136. Mohamad, 566 U.S. at 454 (quoting 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 880 
(2d ed. 1989). 
137. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1279 (2001). 
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provide that a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and 
foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign 
state where it has its principal place of business.”138 U.S. trade law also 
entitles domestic corporations to protection against unfair competition by 
companies from other countries.139 The Oxford English Dictionary, 
which the Court relied on in Mohamad, provides another definition of 
a “national” as “[a] representative of a nation.”140 Some corporations, 
particularly state-owned or government-linked companies, are clearly 
representatives of their nations,141 but other companies are closely 
associated with and understood in a general sense to represent their 
country of incorporation.142 Thus, the ordinary meaning of “national” 
seems to include both natural persons and corporations. 
In defining the term “individual” in Mohamad, the Supreme Court 
also looked to the treatment of the term in other federal statutes, 
finding that they “routinely distinguish between an ‘individual’ and 
an organizational entity of some kind.”143 In contrast, the pattern of 
statutory usage of the term “national” seems less clear. A few other 
statutes distinguish “national[s] of the United States” from 
corporations for purposes of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The statutes 
 
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). 
139. For example, Boeing brought an anti-dumping case seeking high tariffs 
on Canada’s Bombardier C series passenger jets. In October 2017, the 
U.S. commerce department issued a preliminary decision stating that it 
would impose an 80 per cent tariff on top of duties of 220 per cent 
ordered in an earlier anti-subsidy decision that prompted a sharp 
reaction from Canada and the UK. US orders new tariffs on Bombardier 
jets, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 17, 2017.  Although that decision was 
reversed by the United States International Trade Commission, a quasi-
judicial body, it was part of a series of “trade skirmishes” that created 
an “uneasy atmosphere between the longstanding allies” and became 
“an international kerfuffle.”  Ana Swanson, Boeing Denied Bid for 
Tariffs on Canadian Jets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2018. 
140. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 234 (2d ed. 1989). 
141. For example, the Canadian Broadcasting Company, which has no 
shareholders, is a public company managed by a board of directors 
appointed by Canada’s Governor in Council (who serves as the Queen’s 
representative).  See Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c 11, § 36(2) (Can.). 
142. Like airlines and airline manufacturers, a nation’s large automakers are 
often closely associated with its national identity and national interests, 
giving rise to claims that what is good for GM—or another large U.S. 
company—is good for the United States.  For a discussion of the origins 
of that phrase (which is frequently misquoted), see Robert W. 
Patterson, Whatever happened to the “America” in “corporate 
America”? NATIONAL REVIEW (July 1, 2013), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2013/07/whats-good-america-robert-w-
patterson/ [https://perma.cc/8B3T-ZN68].  
143. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 455 (2012). 
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providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of nuclear terrorism 
and violence against maritime transport involving weapons of mass 
destruction provide for jurisdiction when the offense is committed by 
a “national of the United States” or “a United States corporation or 
legal entity.”144  On the other hand, statutes do not use this 
terminology consistently.  For example, a statute governing loan 
guarantees deems a corporation a “citizen or national of the United 
States,”145 and a provision on customs duties defines the term “United 
States citizen” to include “any individual who is a citizen or national 
of the United States” and “any corporation, partnership, association, 
or other legal entity organized or existing under the laws of the 
United States or any State.”146 
Subdivision (2) provides an alternative ground for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction when the accused is “present in the United States.” It 
seems relatively clear that companies are “present” in this sense when 
they are incorporated in the United States or have their principal 
place of business here. (Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that, 
for purposes of civil litigation, a corporation’s place of incorporation 
and a corporation’s principal place of business are the “paradigm” 
places where a corporation can be “fairly regarded” as at home; they 
are “unique ... as well as easily ascertainable[,] ... afford[ing] plaintiffs 
recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which a corporate 
defendant may be sued on any and all claims.”)147   
But in the case of a foreign corporation, what would suffice to 
establish presence in the United States for this purpose? The sparse 
legislative history provides a clue. In hearings on the 2008 
amendments, Senator Durbin raised the issue of extraterritorial 
TVPA jurisdiction, suggesting that U.S. law should provide for 
jurisdiction over an individual trafficker who later retired to the 
United States (and presumably was “present” here).148  Assuming, 
arguendo, that such fleeting physical presence justifies extraterritorial 
TVPA jurisdiction over individuals who are citizens of other nations, 
should the same be true of corporations who do business in the United 
States, even if those transactions are unrelated to the alleged TVPA 
 
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2332i(b)(2)(a) (2015) (nuclear terrorism that takes place 
outside the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 2280a(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2015) 
(violence against maritime navigation and maritime transport involving 
weapons of mass destruction that takes place outside the United States). 
145. 15 U.S.C. § 2509(i). 
146. 19 U.S.C. § 2601(11)(A), (B). 
147. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 751, 760 (2014). 
148. See Legal Options to Stop Human Trafficking: Hearing on H.R. 7311 
Before the Senate Subcomm. On Human Rights and the Law of the 
Senate Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Sen. 
Richard J. Durbin). 
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violations?  If so, this would make extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
the TVPA roughly parallel to general civil jurisdiction, rather than 
specific jurisdiction.  In the civil context, however, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Due Process clause to significantly restrict general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business in the United 
States.149  The Court rejected the argument that general jurisdiction 
obtains in any state in which a corporation “engages in a substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business.”150  A U.S. court may 
only assert general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations where 
“their affiliations with the [forum] State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home” in that state.151 
The Court also cited the need to avoid international discord.152 
Although this was a civil case, the courts might deem some of the 
same constitutional and policy considerations relevant to construing 
the scope of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction under the TVPA.   
2. Civil liability 
On its face, the provision granting extraterritorial jurisdiction 
simply grants jurisdiction over the “offenses,”153 making no reference 
to civil liability. However, the language conferring civil jurisdiction is 
quite broad: it provides that a victim of an offense under Chapter 77 
“may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever 
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from 
participation in a venture which that person knew or should have 
known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an 
appropriate district court of the United States and may recover 
damages and reasonable attorneys fees.”154  
Plaintiffs will likely argue that Congress intended the reach of the 
civil and criminal remedies to coincide, but in recent decisions the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that courts construing federal statutes 
should apply a strong presumption against extraterritorial effect.155  
These cases instructed the federal courts to apply a presumption 
 
149. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (2014). 
150. Id. at 760-61. 
151. Id. at 751 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). 
152. Id. at 762 (discussing the lower court’s failure to consider international 
comity). 
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2008). 
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2015). 
155. Many earlier cases had also recognized this presumption, but its 
application had been uneven and courts more frequently found that 
legislation applied extraterritorially. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 203 ch. 1 note 1 (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 2017). 
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against extraterritoriality: absent a clearly expressed Congressional 
intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only 
domestic application.156 In justifying this presumption, the Court 
emphasized the need to avoid international discord157 or friction, as 
well as the “common sense” view that Congress ordinarily focuses on 
domestic matters.158 Although 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) does contain an 
explicit grant of jurisdiction over criminal violations, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Community159 
suggests that the courts would nonetheless deem the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applicable to the construction of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1595(a), which provides for a civil remedy. In RJR the Court 
confronted the question of whether RICO authorized jurisdiction over 
civil claims for injuries suffered outside the United States.160  Despite 
the fact that many predicate RICO offenses provide for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction,161 the Court concluded that presumption 
against extraterritoriality was applicable to the civil cause of action 
for damages arising from RICO violations, which was accordingly 
limited to domestic injuries.162  By the same logic, the grant of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the criminal offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 
1596(a) has no effect on the reach of the civil action in § 1595(a), 
which would be subject to the strong presumption against 
extraterritorial effect. 
It should be noted, however, that several courts have assumed 
that there will be extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over TVPA 
violations that occur after the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a).  In 
cases arising from conduct before the enactment in § 1596(a), these 
courts have dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the ground that § 
 
156. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117-18 (2013) 
(claims by Nigerian nationals for events that occurred in Nigeria were 
barred because nothing in the Alien Tort Statute rebutted the 
presumption against extraterritoriality); see also Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 did not affirmatively rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality therefore did not apply extraterritorially). 
157. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116-17 (“[T]he danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context 
of the [Alien Tort Statute]”). 
158. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (“[The presumption against 
extraterritoriality] rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily 
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”). 
159. RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
160. Id. at 2096. 
161. See id. at 2101-2 (citing a number of RICO violations that explicitly 
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
162. Id. 2106. 
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1596(a) does not apply retroactively.163  That point, of course, would 
be moot if § 1596(a) had no effect in civil cases.  Indeed, even a court 
that recognized the applicability of RJR Nabisco’s analysis to civil 
causes of action under § 1596 nonetheless suggested that the 2008 
amendments might be given effect in civil cases.164 
Assuming that the courts conclude that there is no extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over actions under § 1595(a), that leaves open the 
question whether some plaintiffs may be able to show that the “focus” 
of the TVPA and violations that “touch and concern the territory of 
the United States … with sufficient force”165 to warrant domestic 
 
163. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190 
(5th Cir. 2017); Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 324 (2d. Cir. 2012); 
Plaintiff A v. Schair, No. 2:11-cv-00145-WCO, 2014 WL 12495639, at 
*3-4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2014). 
164. Adhikari V. KBR, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017 WL 4237923, at *13-14 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2017).  The court stated: 
RJR Nabisco’s general rule is clear: a civil remedy that lacks clear indications 
of extraterritorial reach will redress only injuries experienced 
domestically, no matter the substantive provisions’ scope. Section 1595 
lacks those clear indications. Thus, on question of whether KBR’s 
alleged domestic violations of Section 1590 caused remediable domestic 
injuries or irremediable foreign injuries, the Court must conclude the 
latter. Plaintiffs’ injuries, whatever their cause, were suffered only in 
foreign countries. They are, therefore, beyond the reach of the TVPRA 
that existed at that time. 
 
The Court’s regret in reaching this holding is tempered by its recognition that 
Congress later extended the remedies for forced labor and trafficking to 
apply extraterritorially. That amendment of the law might be taken as 
an indication of the scope that Congress always intended those 
prohibitions to have. One can imagine canons of construction that 
avoided the need for Congress so to act, resolving statutory ambiguity 
in ways that further Congress’s purposes and erring on the side of 
justice. But, as the Supreme Court’s recent rulings instruct, those are 
not our canons. And so Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims must be dismissed. 
165. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013); see 
Skinner, supra note 18, at 656 (suggesting that courts may find no 
extraterritorial civil jurisdiction under the TVPA because of its 
decisions restricting general personal jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations).  For TVPA cases applying these tests, see Samuel v. 
Signal Int’l LLC, No. 1:13 CV-323, 2015 WL 112765986, at *3-4 (E.D. 
Tex, Jan. 26, 2015) (focus of TVPA on where forced labor occurred; 
transporting and recruiting workers into the United States is a domestic 
not extraterritorial application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 & 1590); Tanedo v. 
East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, No. SA CV10-01172 JAK 
(MLGx), 2012 WL 5378742, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2012) 
(concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1590 was not being applied 
extraterritorially when defendants trafficked plaintiffs into the United 
States to work here, though some initial contacts occurred in the 
Philippines),  See also Adhikari V. KBR, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017 
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jurisdiction.  As noted above,166 a producer who gains sales and 
market share in the United States may be “benefitting financially” in 
the United States as a result of forced labor overseas. 
IV. Conclusion 
It is too soon to say whether the TVPA can play an important 
role in holding corporations accountable for human rights violation in 
their supply chains.  Virtually every key term remains to be defined, 
and the scope of the jurisdictional provisions is equally uncertain. It is 
worth noting that in construing the TVPA the federal courts are 
likely to be affected by the same concerns that motivated them to 
limit the ATS’s reach, namely that their capacity to adjudicate cases 
arising from conduct occurring abroad.167  On the other hand, the 
enactment and subsequent amendments broadening the TVPA show 
that Congress has been concerned with activities occurring abroad. 
The strongest case for extraterritorial civil litigation would likely 
involve child sex trafficking, rather than labor trafficking, with 
individual claimants seeking to recover damages from individuals and 
corporate entities that knowingly benefitted from the sex trafficking. 
Such a case would bring into play not only judicial and public concern 
condemnation of such abuse of children, but also highlight Congress’s 
strong concern with protecting and compensating victims of this 
abuse. 
Why has so little precedent construed the TVAP, since nearly 10 
years has passed since the adoption of the civil cause of action and 
the authorization of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction? A guide for 
federal judges describes some of the challenges both courts and 
atttorneys face in extraterritorial cases alleging human rights 
violations: 
Human rights cases often involve the broader challenges 
inherent in any type of transnational litigation, in which 
documents, physical evidence, and witnesses often are located 
outside of the jurisdictional reach of the court. The parties’ need 
to access evidence abroad may require that the court draw upon 
various mechanisms for taking testimony and procuring 
 
WL 4237923, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2017) (concluding that although 
18 U.S.C. 1589’s prohibition on forced labor focuses on the place where 
the forced labor occurred, 18 U.S.C. § 1590’s broader focus could 
encompass conduct of actors in United States who instigated a 
transnational human trafficking scheme but never brought workers to 
the United States).   
166. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing alternative 
construction). 
167. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing judicial concerns). 
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documents overseas. Evidence obtained may be in one or more 
foreign languages, necessitating the use of translation services in 
pretrial and trial proceedings. There also are the challenges 
inherent in adjudicating any piece of complex litigation, such as 
large numbers of parties, large-scale discovery, class action 
certification, and heightened media interest in the case.168 
This account dovetails with concerns about the courts’ capacity to 
adjudicate cases arising from activities occurring abroad, and it 
highlights the enormous difficulties advocates face in attempting to 
pursue civil cases for victims. The government would also face 
enormous hurdles in pursuing such cases. In contrast, it can far more 
easily prosecute TVPA cases involving foreign domestic servants 
treated as virtual slaves in the United States,169 or women trafficked 
and sexually abused or forced to work as prostitutes in the United 
States.170   
The TVPA stands in marked contrast with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, where enforcement has ramped up dramatically since 
1997.171 At least when domestic and international relations 
considerations are favorable, U.S. prosecutors can navigate the 
problems of transnational litigation.172 When will the time be right for 
aggressive enforcement of the TVPA provisions on forced labor and 
benefitting from forced labor overseas?   
 
 
168. Nersessian, supra note 16, at 2. 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhanani, 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010 
(affirming conviction for forced labor, harboring aliens, peonage, and 
domestic servitude for gross mistreatment of domestic servants); United 
States v. Calilmlim, 538 F.3d 706 (affirming forced labor conviction for 
gross mistreatment of housekeeper).  For a case in which the court 
found that the government had taken 18 U.S.C. § 1589 too far, see. 
United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing forced 
labor conviction based on requiring child relatives living with defendant 
to perform household chores and imposing harsh discipline). 
170. See., e.g., United States v. Rivera, 2013 WL 2339381 at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 19, 2012) (denying Rule 29 motion to set aside jury verdict finding 
defendant guilty of forced labor of victims forced to work at bars where 
they were sexually abused). 
171. Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA:  International Resonance and 
Domestic Strategy, 103 U. VA. L. REV. 1611, 1647-56 (2017). 
172. See id. at 1655-78 (Brewster argues persuasively that the increased 
FCPA enforcement occurred only after the United States successfully 
concluded an international treaty that established anti-bribery as a 
binding legal principle, legitimized U.S. prosecutions of foreign 
corporations, and leveled the playing field for U.S. corporations). 
